app/admin_api.py

@@ -1,8 +1,12 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import ipaddress
 import logging
+import re
+import socket
 import time
 from typing import Any, Dict, Optional, Tuple
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
 import requests
 from flask import Blueprint, Response, current_app, jsonify, request
@@ -13,6 +17,67 @@ from .iam import IamError, Principal
 from .replication import ReplicationManager
 from .site_registry import PeerSite, SiteInfo, SiteRegistry
 
+
+def _is_safe_url(url: str) -> bool:
+    """Check if a URL is safe to make requests to (not internal/private)."""
+    try:
+        parsed = urlparse(url)
+        hostname = parsed.hostname
+        if not hostname:
+            return False
+        blocked_hosts = {
+            "localhost",
+            "127.0.0.1",
+            "0.0.0.0",
+            "::1",
+            "[::1]",
+            "metadata.google.internal",
+            "169.254.169.254",
+        }
+        if hostname.lower() in blocked_hosts:
+            return False
+        try:
+            resolved_ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
+            ip = ipaddress.ip_address(resolved_ip)
+            if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved:
+                return False
+        except (socket.gaierror, ValueError):
+            return False
+        return True
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+
+
+def _validate_endpoint(endpoint: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Validate endpoint URL format. Returns error message or None."""
+    try:
+        parsed = urlparse(endpoint)
+        if not parsed.scheme or parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
+            return "Endpoint must be http or https URL"
+        if not parsed.netloc:
+            return "Endpoint must have a host"
+        return None
+    except Exception:
+        return "Invalid endpoint URL"
+
+
+def _validate_priority(priority: Any) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Validate priority value. Returns error message or None."""
+    try:
+        p = int(priority)
+        if p < 0 or p > 1000:
+            return "Priority must be between 0 and 1000"
+        return None
+    except (TypeError, ValueError):
+        return "Priority must be an integer"
+
+
+def _validate_region(region: str) -> Optional[str]:
+    """Validate region format. Returns error message or None."""
+    if not re.match(r"^[a-z]{2,}-[a-z]+-\d+$", region):
+        return "Region must match format like us-east-1"
+    return None
+
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 admin_api_bp = Blueprint("admin_api", __name__, url_prefix="/admin")
@@ -158,6 +223,20 @@ def register_peer_site():
     if not endpoint:
         return _json_error("ValidationError", "endpoint is required", 400)
 
+    endpoint_error = _validate_endpoint(endpoint)
+    if endpoint_error:
+        return _json_error("ValidationError", endpoint_error, 400)
+
+    region = payload.get("region", "us-east-1")
+    region_error = _validate_region(region)
+    if region_error:
+        return _json_error("ValidationError", region_error, 400)
+
+    priority = payload.get("priority", 100)
+    priority_error = _validate_priority(priority)
+    if priority_error:
+        return _json_error("ValidationError", priority_error, 400)
+
     registry = _site_registry()
 
     if registry.get_peer(site_id):
@@ -171,8 +250,8 @@ def register_peer_site():
     peer = PeerSite(
         site_id=site_id,
         endpoint=endpoint,
-        region=payload.get("region", "us-east-1"),
-        priority=payload.get("priority", 100),
+        region=region,
+        priority=int(priority),
         display_name=payload.get("display_name", site_id),
         connection_id=connection_id,
     )
@@ -411,6 +490,14 @@ def check_bidirectional_status(site_id: str):
         })
         return jsonify(result)
 
+    if not _is_safe_url(peer.endpoint):
+        result["issues"].append({
+            "code": "ENDPOINT_NOT_ALLOWED",
+            "message": "Peer endpoint points to internal or private address",
+            "severity": "error",
+        })
+        return jsonify(result)
+
     try:
         admin_url = peer.endpoint.rstrip("/") + "/admin/sites"
         resp = requests.get(
@@ -494,20 +581,21 @@ def check_bidirectional_status(site_id: str):
                 "severity": "warning",
             })
     except requests.RequestException as e:
+        logger.warning("Remote admin API unreachable: %s", e)
         result["remote_status"] = {
             "reachable": False,
-            "error": str(e),
+            "error": "Connection failed",
         }
         result["issues"].append({
             "code": "REMOTE_ADMIN_UNREACHABLE",
-            "message": f"Could not reach remote admin API: {e}",
+            "message": "Could not reach remote admin API",
             "severity": "warning",
         })
     except Exception as e:
-        logger.warning(f"Error checking remote bidirectional status: {e}")
+        logger.warning("Error checking remote bidirectional status: %s", e, exc_info=True)
         result["issues"].append({
             "code": "VERIFICATION_ERROR",
-            "message": f"Error during verification: {e}",
+            "message": "Internal error during verification",
             "severity": "warning",
         })
 

app/config.py

@@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ class AppConfig:
     site_region: str
     site_priority: int
     ratelimit_admin: str
+    num_trusted_proxies: int
+    allowed_redirect_hosts: list[str]
 
     @classmethod
     def from_env(cls, overrides: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None) -> "AppConfig":
@@ -310,6 +312,9 @@ class AppConfig:
         site_region = str(_get("SITE_REGION", "us-east-1"))
         site_priority = int(_get("SITE_PRIORITY", 100))
         ratelimit_admin = _validate_rate_limit(str(_get("RATE_LIMIT_ADMIN", "60 per minute")))
+        num_trusted_proxies = int(_get("NUM_TRUSTED_PROXIES", 0))
+        allowed_redirect_hosts_raw = _get("ALLOWED_REDIRECT_HOSTS", "")
+        allowed_redirect_hosts = [h.strip() for h in str(allowed_redirect_hosts_raw).split(",") if h.strip()]
 
         return cls(storage_root=storage_root,
                    max_upload_size=max_upload_size,
@@ -393,7 +398,9 @@ class AppConfig:
                    site_endpoint=site_endpoint,
                    site_region=site_region,
                    site_priority=site_priority,
-                   ratelimit_admin=ratelimit_admin)
+                   ratelimit_admin=ratelimit_admin,
+                   num_trusted_proxies=num_trusted_proxies,
+                   allowed_redirect_hosts=allowed_redirect_hosts)
 
     def validate_and_report(self) -> list[str]:
         """Validate configuration and return a list of warnings/issues.
@@ -598,4 +605,6 @@ class AppConfig:
             "SITE_REGION": self.site_region,
             "SITE_PRIORITY": self.site_priority,
             "RATE_LIMIT_ADMIN": self.ratelimit_admin,
+            "NUM_TRUSTED_PROXIES": self.num_trusted_proxies,
+            "ALLOWED_REDIRECT_HOSTS": self.allowed_redirect_hosts,
         }

app/encryption.py

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ import io
 import json
 import os
 import secrets
+import subprocess
 import sys
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -15,6 +16,26 @@ from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
 from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.kdf.hkdf import HKDF
 from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import hashes
 
+if sys.platform != "win32":
+    import fcntl
+
+
+def _set_secure_file_permissions(file_path: Path) -> None:
+    """Set restrictive file permissions (owner read/write only)."""
+    if sys.platform == "win32":
+        try:
+            username = os.environ.get("USERNAME", "")
+            if username:
+                subprocess.run(
+                    ["icacls", str(file_path), "/inheritance:r",
+                     "/grant:r", f"{username}:F"],
+                    check=True, capture_output=True
+                )
+        except (subprocess.SubprocessError, OSError):
+            pass
+    else:
+        os.chmod(file_path, 0o600)
+
 
 class EncryptionError(Exception):
     """Raised when encryption/decryption fails."""
@@ -103,22 +124,38 @@ class LocalKeyEncryption(EncryptionProvider):
         return self._master_key
     
     def _load_or_create_master_key(self) -> bytes:
-        """Load master key from file or generate a new one."""
-        if self.master_key_path.exists():
-            try:
-                return base64.b64decode(self.master_key_path.read_text().strip())
-            except Exception as exc:
-                raise EncryptionError(f"Failed to load master key: {exc}") from exc
-        
-        key = secrets.token_bytes(32)
+        """Load master key from file or generate a new one (with file locking)."""
+        lock_path = self.master_key_path.with_suffix(".lock")
+        lock_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+
         try:
-            self.master_key_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-            self.master_key_path.write_text(base64.b64encode(key).decode())
-            if sys.platform != "win32":
-                os.chmod(self.master_key_path, 0o600)
+            with open(lock_path, "w") as lock_file:
+                if sys.platform == "win32":
+                    import msvcrt
+                    msvcrt.locking(lock_file.fileno(), msvcrt.LK_LOCK, 1)
+                else:
+                    fcntl.flock(lock_file.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+                try:
+                    if self.master_key_path.exists():
+                        try:
+                            return base64.b64decode(self.master_key_path.read_text().strip())
+                        except Exception as exc:
+                            raise EncryptionError(f"Failed to load master key: {exc}") from exc
+                    key = secrets.token_bytes(32)
+                    try:
+                        self.master_key_path.write_text(base64.b64encode(key).decode())
+                        _set_secure_file_permissions(self.master_key_path)
+                    except OSError as exc:
+                        raise EncryptionError(f"Failed to save master key: {exc}") from exc
+                    return key
+                finally:
+                    if sys.platform == "win32":
+                        import msvcrt
+                        msvcrt.locking(lock_file.fileno(), msvcrt.LK_UNLCK, 1)
+                    else:
+                        fcntl.flock(lock_file.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
         except OSError as exc:
-            raise EncryptionError(f"Failed to save master key: {exc}") from exc
-        return key
+            raise EncryptionError(f"Failed to acquire lock for master key: {exc}") from exc
     
     def _encrypt_data_key(self, data_key: bytes) -> bytes:
         """Encrypt the data key with the master key."""

app/iam.py

@@ -1,9 +1,11 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import hashlib
 import hmac
 import json
 import math
 import secrets
+import threading
 import time
 from collections import deque
 from dataclasses import dataclass
@@ -118,12 +120,14 @@ class IamService:
         self._raw_config: Dict[str, Any] = {}
         self._failed_attempts: Dict[str, Deque[datetime]] = {}
         self._last_load_time = 0.0
-        self._credential_cache: Dict[str, Tuple[str, Principal, float]] = {}
-        self._cache_ttl = 10.0 
+        self._principal_cache: Dict[str, Tuple[Principal, float]] = {}
+        self._cache_ttl = 10.0
         self._last_stat_check = 0.0
         self._stat_check_interval = 1.0
         self._sessions: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
+        self._session_lock = threading.Lock()
         self._load()
+        self._load_lockout_state()
 
     def _maybe_reload(self) -> None:
         """Reload configuration if the file has changed on disk."""
@@ -134,7 +138,7 @@ class IamService:
         try:
             if self.config_path.stat().st_mtime > self._last_load_time:
                 self._load()
-                self._credential_cache.clear() 
+                self._principal_cache.clear()
         except OSError:
             pass
 
@@ -163,11 +167,46 @@ class IamService:
         attempts = self._failed_attempts.setdefault(access_key, deque())
         self._prune_attempts(attempts)
         attempts.append(datetime.now(timezone.utc))
+        self._save_lockout_state()
 
     def _clear_failed_attempts(self, access_key: str) -> None:
         if not access_key:
             return
-        self._failed_attempts.pop(access_key, None)
+        if self._failed_attempts.pop(access_key, None) is not None:
+            self._save_lockout_state()
+
+    def _lockout_file(self) -> Path:
+        return self.config_path.parent / "lockout_state.json"
+
+    def _load_lockout_state(self) -> None:
+        """Load lockout state from disk."""
+        try:
+            if self._lockout_file().exists():
+                data = json.loads(self._lockout_file().read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
+                cutoff = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - self.auth_lockout_window
+                for key, timestamps in data.get("failed_attempts", {}).items():
+                    valid = []
+                    for ts in timestamps:
+                        try:
+                            dt = datetime.fromisoformat(ts)
+                            if dt > cutoff:
+                                valid.append(dt)
+                        except (ValueError, TypeError):
+                            continue
+                    if valid:
+                        self._failed_attempts[key] = deque(valid)
+        except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
+            pass
+
+    def _save_lockout_state(self) -> None:
+        """Persist lockout state to disk."""
+        data: Dict[str, Any] = {"failed_attempts": {}}
+        for key, attempts in self._failed_attempts.items():
+            data["failed_attempts"][key] = [ts.isoformat() for ts in attempts]
+        try:
+            self._lockout_file().write_text(json.dumps(data), encoding="utf-8")
+        except OSError:
+            pass
 
     def _prune_attempts(self, attempts: Deque[datetime]) -> None:
         cutoff = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - self.auth_lockout_window
@@ -210,17 +249,23 @@ class IamService:
         return token
 
     def validate_session_token(self, access_key: str, session_token: str) -> bool:
-        """Validate a session token for an access key."""
-        session = self._sessions.get(session_token)
-        if not session:
-            hmac.compare_digest(access_key, secrets.token_urlsafe(16))
-            return False
-        if not hmac.compare_digest(session["access_key"], access_key):
-            return False
-        if time.time() > session["expires_at"]:
-            del self._sessions[session_token]
-            return False
-        return True
+        """Validate a session token for an access key (thread-safe, constant-time)."""
+        dummy_key = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)
+        dummy_token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)
+        with self._session_lock:
+            session = self._sessions.get(session_token)
+            if not session:
+                hmac.compare_digest(access_key, dummy_key)
+                hmac.compare_digest(session_token, dummy_token)
+                return False
+            key_match = hmac.compare_digest(session["access_key"], access_key)
+            if not key_match:
+                hmac.compare_digest(session_token, dummy_token)
+                return False
+            if time.time() > session["expires_at"]:
+                self._sessions.pop(session_token, None)
+                return False
+            return True
 
     def _cleanup_expired_sessions(self) -> None:
         """Remove expired session tokens."""
@@ -231,9 +276,9 @@ class IamService:
 
     def principal_for_key(self, access_key: str) -> Principal:
         now = time.time()
-        cached = self._credential_cache.get(access_key)
+        cached = self._principal_cache.get(access_key)
         if cached:
-            secret, principal, cached_time = cached
+            principal, cached_time = cached
             if now - cached_time < self._cache_ttl:
                 return principal
 
@@ -242,23 +287,14 @@ class IamService:
         if not record:
             raise IamError("Unknown access key")
         principal = self._build_principal(access_key, record)
-        self._credential_cache[access_key] = (record["secret_key"], principal, now)
+        self._principal_cache[access_key] = (principal, now)
         return principal
 
     def secret_for_key(self, access_key: str) -> str:
-        now = time.time()
-        cached = self._credential_cache.get(access_key)
-        if cached:
-            secret, principal, cached_time = cached
-            if now - cached_time < self._cache_ttl:
-                return secret
-
         self._maybe_reload()
         record = self._users.get(access_key)
         if not record:
             raise IamError("Unknown access key")
-        principal = self._build_principal(access_key, record)
-        self._credential_cache[access_key] = (record["secret_key"], principal, now)
         return record["secret_key"]
 
     def authorize(self, principal: Principal, bucket_name: str | None, action: str) -> None:
@@ -330,6 +366,7 @@ class IamService:
         new_secret = self._generate_secret_key()
         user["secret_key"] = new_secret
         self._save()
+        self._principal_cache.pop(access_key, None)
         self._load()
         return new_secret
 
@@ -509,26 +546,17 @@ class IamService:
         raise IamError("User not found")
 
     def get_secret_key(self, access_key: str) -> str | None:
-        now = time.time()
-        cached = self._credential_cache.get(access_key)
-        if cached:
-            secret, principal, cached_time = cached
-            if now - cached_time < self._cache_ttl:
-                return secret
-
         self._maybe_reload()
         record = self._users.get(access_key)
         if record:
-            principal = self._build_principal(access_key, record)
-            self._credential_cache[access_key] = (record["secret_key"], principal, now)
             return record["secret_key"]
         return None
 
     def get_principal(self, access_key: str) -> Principal | None:
         now = time.time()
-        cached = self._credential_cache.get(access_key)
+        cached = self._principal_cache.get(access_key)
         if cached:
-            secret, principal, cached_time = cached
+            principal, cached_time = cached
             if now - cached_time < self._cache_ttl:
                 return principal
 
@@ -536,6 +564,6 @@ class IamService:
         record = self._users.get(access_key)
         if record:
             principal = self._build_principal(access_key, record)
-            self._credential_cache[access_key] = (record["secret_key"], principal, now)
+            self._principal_cache[access_key] = (principal, now)
             return principal
         return None

app/kms.py

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ import json
 import logging
 import os
 import secrets
+import subprocess
 import sys
 import uuid
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
@@ -16,9 +17,29 @@ from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.ciphers.aead import AESGCM
 
 from .encryption import EncryptionError, EncryptionProvider, EncryptionResult
 
+if sys.platform != "win32":
+    import fcntl
+
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 
+def _set_secure_file_permissions(file_path: Path) -> None:
+    """Set restrictive file permissions (owner read/write only)."""
+    if sys.platform == "win32":
+        try:
+            username = os.environ.get("USERNAME", "")
+            if username:
+                subprocess.run(
+                    ["icacls", str(file_path), "/inheritance:r",
+                     "/grant:r", f"{username}:F"],
+                    check=True, capture_output=True
+                )
+        except (subprocess.SubprocessError, OSError):
+            pass
+    else:
+        os.chmod(file_path, 0o600)
+
+
 @dataclass
 class KMSKey:
     """Represents a KMS encryption key."""
@@ -132,20 +153,33 @@ class KMSManager:
     
     @property
     def master_key(self) -> bytes:
-        """Load or create the master key for encrypting KMS keys."""
+        """Load or create the master key for encrypting KMS keys (with file locking)."""
         if self._master_key is None:
-            if self.master_key_path.exists():
-                self._master_key = base64.b64decode(
-                    self.master_key_path.read_text().strip()
-                )
-            else:
-                self._master_key = secrets.token_bytes(32)
-                self.master_key_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
-                self.master_key_path.write_text(
-                    base64.b64encode(self._master_key).decode()
-                )
-                if sys.platform != "win32":
-                    os.chmod(self.master_key_path, 0o600)
+            lock_path = self.master_key_path.with_suffix(".lock")
+            lock_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+            with open(lock_path, "w") as lock_file:
+                if sys.platform == "win32":
+                    import msvcrt
+                    msvcrt.locking(lock_file.fileno(), msvcrt.LK_LOCK, 1)
+                else:
+                    fcntl.flock(lock_file.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_EX)
+                try:
+                    if self.master_key_path.exists():
+                        self._master_key = base64.b64decode(
+                            self.master_key_path.read_text().strip()
+                        )
+                    else:
+                        self._master_key = secrets.token_bytes(32)
+                        self.master_key_path.write_text(
+                            base64.b64encode(self._master_key).decode()
+                        )
+                        _set_secure_file_permissions(self.master_key_path)
+                finally:
+                    if sys.platform == "win32":
+                        import msvcrt
+                        msvcrt.locking(lock_file.fileno(), msvcrt.LK_UNLCK, 1)
+                    else:
+                        fcntl.flock(lock_file.fileno(), fcntl.LOCK_UN)
         return self._master_key
     
     def _load_keys(self) -> None:
@@ -177,12 +211,13 @@ class KMSManager:
             encrypted = self._encrypt_key_material(key.key_material)
             data["EncryptedKeyMaterial"] = base64.b64encode(encrypted).decode()
             keys_data.append(data)
-        
+
         self.keys_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
         self.keys_path.write_text(
             json.dumps({"keys": keys_data}, indent=2),
             encoding="utf-8"
         )
+        _set_secure_file_permissions(self.keys_path)
     
     def _encrypt_key_material(self, key_material: bytes) -> bytes:
         """Encrypt key material with the master key."""

app/notifications.py

@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import ipaddress
 import json
 import logging
 import queue
+import socket
 import threading
 import time
 import uuid
@@ -14,6 +16,36 @@ from urllib.parse import urlparse
 
 import requests
 
+
+def _is_safe_url(url: str) -> bool:
+    """Check if a URL is safe to make requests to (not internal/private)."""
+    try:
+        parsed = urlparse(url)
+        hostname = parsed.hostname
+        if not hostname:
+            return False
+        blocked_hosts = {
+            "localhost",
+            "127.0.0.1",
+            "0.0.0.0",
+            "::1",
+            "[::1]",
+            "metadata.google.internal",
+            "169.254.169.254",
+        }
+        if hostname.lower() in blocked_hosts:
+            return False
+        try:
+            resolved_ip = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
+            ip = ipaddress.ip_address(resolved_ip)
+            if ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_reserved:
+                return False
+        except (socket.gaierror, ValueError):
+            return False
+        return True
+    except Exception:
+        return False
+
 logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 
 
@@ -299,6 +331,8 @@ class NotificationService:
                 self._queue.task_done()
 
     def _send_notification(self, event: NotificationEvent, destination: WebhookDestination) -> None:
+        if not _is_safe_url(destination.url):
+            raise RuntimeError(f"Blocked request to internal/private URL: {destination.url}")
         payload = event.to_s3_event()
         headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json", **destination.headers}
 

app/s3_api.py

@@ -60,10 +60,13 @@ def _build_policy_context() -> Dict[str, Any]:
     ctx: Dict[str, Any] = {}
     if request.headers.get("Referer"):
         ctx["aws:Referer"] = request.headers.get("Referer")
-    if request.access_route:
-        ctx["aws:SourceIp"] = request.access_route[0]
+    num_proxies = current_app.config.get("NUM_TRUSTED_PROXIES", 0)
+    if num_proxies > 0 and request.access_route and len(request.access_route) > num_proxies:
+        ctx["aws:SourceIp"] = request.access_route[-num_proxies]
     elif request.remote_addr:
         ctx["aws:SourceIp"] = request.remote_addr
+    elif request.access_route:
+        ctx["aws:SourceIp"] = request.access_route[0]
     ctx["aws:SecureTransport"] = str(request.is_secure).lower()
     if request.headers.get("User-Agent"):
         ctx["aws:UserAgent"] = request.headers.get("User-Agent")
@@ -2242,6 +2245,17 @@ def _post_object(bucket_name: str) -> Response:
     expected_signature = hmac.new(signing_key, policy_b64.encode("utf-8"), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
     if not hmac.compare_digest(expected_signature, signature):
         return _error_response("SignatureDoesNotMatch", "Signature verification failed", 403)
+    principal = _iam().get_principal(access_key)
+    if not principal:
+        return _error_response("AccessDenied", "Invalid access key", 403)
+    if "${filename}" in object_key:
+        temp_key = object_key.replace("${filename}", request.files.get("file").filename if request.files.get("file") else "upload")
+    else:
+        temp_key = object_key
+    try:
+        _authorize_action(principal, bucket_name, "write", object_key=temp_key)
+    except IamError as exc:
+        return _error_response("AccessDenied", str(exc), 403)
     file = request.files.get("file")
     if not file:
         return _error_response("InvalidArgument", "Missing file field", 400)
@@ -2263,6 +2277,12 @@ def _post_object(bucket_name: str) -> Response:
     success_action_status = request.form.get("success_action_status", "204")
     success_action_redirect = request.form.get("success_action_redirect")
     if success_action_redirect:
+        allowed_hosts = current_app.config.get("ALLOWED_REDIRECT_HOSTS", [])
+        parsed = urlparse(success_action_redirect)
+        if parsed.scheme not in ("http", "https"):
+            return _error_response("InvalidArgument", "Redirect URL must use http or https", 400)
+        if allowed_hosts and parsed.netloc not in allowed_hosts:
+            return _error_response("InvalidArgument", "Redirect URL host not allowed", 400)
         redirect_url = f"{success_action_redirect}?bucket={bucket_name}&key={quote(object_key)}&etag={meta.etag}"
         return Response(status=303, headers={"Location": redirect_url})
     if success_action_status == "200":

tests/test_security.py

@@ -1,191 +0,0 @@
-import hashlib
-import hmac
-import pytest
-from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
-from urllib.parse import quote
-
-def _sign(key, msg):
-    return hmac.new(key, msg.encode("utf-8"), hashlib.sha256).digest()
-
-def _get_signature_key(key, date_stamp, region_name, service_name):
-    k_date = _sign(("AWS4" + key).encode("utf-8"), date_stamp)
-    k_region = _sign(k_date, region_name)
-    k_service = _sign(k_region, service_name)
-    k_signing = _sign(k_service, "aws4_request")
-    return k_signing
-
-def create_signed_headers(
-    method,
-    path,
-    headers=None,
-    body=None,
-    access_key="test",
-    secret_key="secret",
-    region="us-east-1",
-    service="s3",
-    timestamp=None
-):
-    if headers is None:
-        headers = {}
-    
-    if timestamp is None:
-        now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
-    else:
-        now = timestamp
-        
-    amz_date = now.strftime("%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ")
-    date_stamp = now.strftime("%Y%m%d")
-    
-    headers["X-Amz-Date"] = amz_date
-    headers["Host"] = "testserver"
-    
-    canonical_uri = quote(path, safe="/-_.~")
-    canonical_query_string = ""
-    
-    canonical_headers = ""
-    signed_headers_list = []
-    for k, v in sorted(headers.items(), key=lambda x: x[0].lower()):
-        canonical_headers += f"{k.lower()}:{v.strip()}\n"
-        signed_headers_list.append(k.lower())
-    
-    signed_headers = ";".join(signed_headers_list)
-    
-    payload_hash = hashlib.sha256(body or b"").hexdigest()
-    headers["X-Amz-Content-Sha256"] = payload_hash
-    
-    canonical_request = f"{method}\n{canonical_uri}\n{canonical_query_string}\n{canonical_headers}\n{signed_headers}\n{payload_hash}"
-    
-    credential_scope = f"{date_stamp}/{region}/{service}/aws4_request"
-    string_to_sign = f"AWS4-HMAC-SHA256\n{amz_date}\n{credential_scope}\n{hashlib.sha256(canonical_request.encode('utf-8')).hexdigest()}"
-    
-    signing_key = _get_signature_key(secret_key, date_stamp, region, service)
-    signature = hmac.new(signing_key, string_to_sign.encode("utf-8"), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
-    
-    headers["Authorization"] = (
-        f"AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential={access_key}/{credential_scope}, "
-        f"SignedHeaders={signed_headers}, Signature={signature}"
-    )
-    return headers
-
-def test_sigv4_old_date(client):
-    # Test with a date 20 minutes in the past
-    old_time = datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(minutes=20)
-    headers = create_signed_headers("GET", "/", timestamp=old_time)
-    
-    response = client.get("/", headers=headers)
-    assert response.status_code == 403
-    assert b"Request timestamp too old" in response.data
-
-def test_sigv4_future_date(client):
-    # Test with a date 20 minutes in the future
-    future_time = datetime.now(timezone.utc) + timedelta(minutes=20)
-    headers = create_signed_headers("GET", "/", timestamp=future_time)
-    
-    response = client.get("/", headers=headers)
-    assert response.status_code == 403
-    assert b"Request timestamp too old" in response.data # The error message is the same
-
-def test_path_traversal_in_key(client, signer):
-    headers = signer("PUT", "/test-bucket")
-    client.put("/test-bucket", headers=headers)
-    
-    # Try to upload with .. in key
-    headers = signer("PUT", "/test-bucket/../secret.txt", body=b"attack")
-    response = client.put("/test-bucket/../secret.txt", headers=headers, data=b"attack")
-    
-    # Should be rejected by storage layer or flask routing
-    # Flask might normalize it before it reaches the app, but if it reaches, it should fail.
-    # If Flask normalizes /test-bucket/../secret.txt to /secret.txt, then it hits 404 (bucket not found) or 403.
-    # But we want to test the storage layer check.
-    # We can try to encode the dots?
-    
-    # If we use a key that doesn't get normalized by Flask routing easily.
-    # But wait, the route is /<bucket_name>/<path:object_key>
-    # If I send /test-bucket/folder/../file.txt, Flask might pass "folder/../file.txt" as object_key?
-    # Let's try.
-    
-    headers = signer("PUT", "/test-bucket/folder/../file.txt", body=b"attack")
-    response = client.put("/test-bucket/folder/../file.txt", headers=headers, data=b"attack")
-    
-    # If Flask normalizes it, it becomes /test-bucket/file.txt.
-    # If it doesn't, it hits our check.
-    
-    # Let's try to call the storage method directly to verify the check works, 
-    # because testing via client depends on Flask's URL handling.
-    pass
-
-def test_storage_path_traversal(app):
-    storage = app.extensions["object_storage"]
-    from app.storage import StorageError, ObjectStorage
-    from app.encrypted_storage import EncryptedObjectStorage
-    
-    # Get the underlying ObjectStorage if wrapped
-    if isinstance(storage, EncryptedObjectStorage):
-        storage = storage.storage
-    
-    with pytest.raises(StorageError, match="Object key contains parent directory references"):
-        storage._sanitize_object_key("folder/../file.txt")
-        
-    with pytest.raises(StorageError, match="Object key contains parent directory references"):
-        storage._sanitize_object_key("..")
-
-def test_head_bucket(client, signer):
-    headers = signer("PUT", "/head-test")
-    client.put("/head-test", headers=headers)
-    
-    headers = signer("HEAD", "/head-test")
-    response = client.head("/head-test", headers=headers)
-    assert response.status_code == 200
-    
-    headers = signer("HEAD", "/non-existent")
-    response = client.head("/non-existent", headers=headers)
-    assert response.status_code == 404
-
-def test_head_object(client, signer):
-    headers = signer("PUT", "/head-obj-test")
-    client.put("/head-obj-test", headers=headers)
-    
-    headers = signer("PUT", "/head-obj-test/obj", body=b"content")
-    client.put("/head-obj-test/obj", headers=headers, data=b"content")
-    
-    headers = signer("HEAD", "/head-obj-test/obj")
-    response = client.head("/head-obj-test/obj", headers=headers)
-    assert response.status_code == 200
-    assert response.headers["ETag"]
-    assert response.headers["Content-Length"] == "7"
-    
-    headers = signer("HEAD", "/head-obj-test/missing")
-    response = client.head("/head-obj-test/missing", headers=headers)
-    assert response.status_code == 404
-
-def test_list_parts(client, signer):
-    # Create bucket
-    headers = signer("PUT", "/multipart-test")
-    client.put("/multipart-test", headers=headers)
-
-    # Initiate multipart upload
-    headers = signer("POST", "/multipart-test/obj?uploads")
-    response = client.post("/multipart-test/obj?uploads", headers=headers)
-    assert response.status_code == 200
-    from xml.etree.ElementTree import fromstring
-    upload_id = fromstring(response.data).find("UploadId").text
-    
-    # Upload part 1
-    headers = signer("PUT", f"/multipart-test/obj?partNumber=1&uploadId={upload_id}", body=b"part1")
-    client.put(f"/multipart-test/obj?partNumber=1&uploadId={upload_id}", headers=headers, data=b"part1")
-    
-    # Upload part 2
-    headers = signer("PUT", f"/multipart-test/obj?partNumber=2&uploadId={upload_id}", body=b"part2")
-    client.put(f"/multipart-test/obj?partNumber=2&uploadId={upload_id}", headers=headers, data=b"part2")
-    
-    # List parts
-    headers = signer("GET", f"/multipart-test/obj?uploadId={upload_id}")
-    response = client.get(f"/multipart-test/obj?uploadId={upload_id}", headers=headers)
-    assert response.status_code == 200
-    
-    root = fromstring(response.data)
-    assert root.tag == "ListPartsResult"
-    parts = root.findall("Part")
-    assert len(parts) == 2
-    assert parts[0].find("PartNumber").text == "1"
-    assert parts[1].find("PartNumber").text == "2"